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Child support enforcement is a notoriously difficult proposition.
According to the 2011 United States census, in 2009 only 61% of the $35.1
billion due in child support was reported as received, averaging $3,630 per
custodial parent entitled to support.1 Although this is an improvement from
previous years, the numbers are sobering, given that 28.3% of all custodial
parents’ incomes were below the poverty level.2 Complicating matters is
noncustodial parents’ inability to pay the required support. Indeed, parents
+
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. Many
thanks to the members of the University of Chicago Law School, especially Lisa Bernstein, and
the University of Kentucky College of Law, especially Brian Frye, as well as the participants of
the Second Annual Younger Comparativists Committee Conference at Indiana University Robert
H. McKinney School of Law, for their comments on this Article during its presentation. Thanks
also to the editors of the Catholic University Law Review for their skillful editing.
1. TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND
THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2009 1, 10 (2011) [hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT: 2009], available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-240.pdf. By comparison, in 2007, 62.7% of the $34.1
billion due in child support in the United States was reported as received, averaging $3,350 per
custodial parent due support. TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Custodial Mothers and
Fathers and Their Child Support: 2007 (2009) [hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT: 2007], available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-237.pdf.
2. CHILD SUPPORT: 2009, supra note 1, at 1. By comparison, in 2007, 24.6% of custodial
parents were below the poverty level, 18.2% of which received at least some child support.
CHILD SUPPORT: 2007, supra note 1, at 1. Since the early twenty-first century, the rate of minor
children living below the poverty line has risen from 16% to 20%. Leslie J. Harris, Questioning
Child Support Enforcement Policy for Poor Families, 45 FAM. L.Q. 157, 158–59 (2011).
Additionally, child poverty is more prevalent among children of unmarried or single parents. Id.
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with incomes of $10,000 per year or less owe approximately 70% of
outstanding child support arrears.3
An effective child support system is important to all of the parties
involved. A functioning system is vital for the children who are entitled to
such support: children born out of wedlock and children born to parents
who divorce.4 The effectiveness of the child support system is also
important to taxpayers, whose tax dollars fund the public assistance that
often substitutes for parental support.5 Accordingly, governments have
spent significant resources to ensure that parents meet their child support
obligations.6
Enforcement of child support responsibilities has become quite
aggressive and frequently involves the court system. This increased
judicial involvement prompted one commentator to question whether
“deadbeats [are] born or made by a system that creates impossible
burdens.”7 Indeed, some parents have even been incarcerated for failing to
make child support payments, often without the benefit of counsel.8 The
U.S. Supreme Court recently considered the constitutionality of the failure
to provide counsel to indigent parents in Turner v. Rogers, which held that,
although due process does not require a state to provide counsel to a debtor
parent, the state is obligated to ensure “a fundamentally fair determination
of the critical incarcerated-related question” of whether the debtor parent is

3. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011).
4. See Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer & Eunhee Han, Child Support: Responsible
Fatherhood and the Quid Pro Quo, 635 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 153 (2011)
(reporting that child support helps to reduce child poverty in single-parent homes); see also
Chien-Chung Huang & Ke-Qing Han, Child Support Enforcement in the United States: Has
Policy Made a Difference?, 34 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 622, 623–26 (2012) (reviewing
multiple articles on both the direct and indirect effects of child support enforcement policies and
concluding that efforts to improve the enforcement system will have both short- and long-term
benefits for children and their families).
5. See Ann Laquer Estin, Moving Beyond the Child Support Revolution, 26 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 505, 505 (2001) (explaining that the child support revolution was motivated in part by a
desire to “allow the government to recoup its growing expenditures for public benefits”).
6. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (discussing public expenditures and
administrative costs associated with the enforcement of child support obligations).
7. Ronald K. Henry, Child Support at a Crossroads: When the Real World Intrudes Upon
Academics and Advocates, 33 FAM. L.Q. 235, 241 (1999).
8. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (considering the constitutionality of South
Carolina’s child support enforcement practices, which included prosecuting indigent parents for
failing to fulfill their support obligations and refusing to provide them with counsel). The
desirability and effectiveness of this practice is beyond the scope of this Article.
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able to fulfill his or her support obligations.9 The Court’s holding reflects
the judiciary’s effort to protect the rights of the noncustodial parent while
also recognizing the custodial parent’s entitlement to monetary support.
In the United States, there are two types of parties who sue noncustodial
parents to modify or enforce child support orders: (1) custodial parents, and
(2) state agencies.10 Specifically, under state law, each parent may sue the
other to enforce or modify support obligations (unless one parent is on
welfare and consequently assigned his or her right to sue to the state), or
the state agency that would otherwise provide public funds to support the
child may sue the debtor parent.11
Although federal law provides a direct right of action against government
officials through 42 U.S.C. § 1983,12 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
federal child support law does not provide parents with “a federal right to
force a state agency to substantially comply with” its provisions.13
Consequently, custodial parents cannot use § 1983 to enforce child support
orders by suing the relevant government agencies.
A comparative analysis of child support enforcement cases in the United
States and United Kingdom highlights the consequences of minimizing or
maximizing the participation of the courts in child support disputes. In
contrast to the Untied States, parents in the United Kingdom cannot use the
legal system to sue each other for the failure to meet child support
obligations.14 Instead, only the Child Support Agency—the government
agency that manages child support—has standing to sue.15 As a
9. Id. at 2512. The Court ultimately vacated the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme
Court and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the state provided a fair
determination of whether the appellant was able to meet his obligations. Id. at 2520.
10. See,
e.g.,
Child
Support
Services,
S.D.
DEP’T
SOC.
SERVS.,
http://dss.sd.gov/childsupport/services/whoestablishes.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (“The
Division of Child Support or a parent may ask the court to issue a support order.”).
11. See infra notes 69–74 and accompanying text (discussing state enforcement
mechanisms, including actions taken directly by the state against noncustodial parents).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. . . .”).
13. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 333 (1997); see also infra Part III.B.1 (discussing,
in detail, Blessing’s foreclosure on a private right of action against the state to enforce child
support obligations).
14. R (Kehoe) v. Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, [2005] UKHL 48 [2006] 1 A.C.
(H.L.) 57, [6]–[8] (appeal taken from Eng.) (concluding that the legislature acted deliberately in
prohibiting a direct right of action between parents).
15. Id. at 54, [3].

1010

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:1007

consequence, custodial parents in the United Kingdom must cede control
over the collection of the child support to which they are entitled.16 On the
other hand, in contrast to the United States, there is judicial review of the
child support government agency.17
The comparison between the United Kingdom and the United States is
useful not only because each country has adopted different approaches to
enforcing child support judgments, but also because some comparable data
is available. For example, for every £1 spent on the administration of the
child support system in the United Kingdom, £2.86 in owed child support
is recovered,18 compared to $5.12 recovered for every $1 spent in the
United States.19 Similarly, the percentage of cases with a current
maintenance liability being received is 80% in the United Kingdom,20
compared to the 70.8% of custodial parents who received any payment in
the United States.21 Finally, there are approximately 1.2 million child
support cases in the United Kingdom that require state attention,22
compared to the 15.8 million cases enrolled in the United States’ federal
IV-D program.23
This Article argues that, if the goal of a child support enforcement
system is to increase the efficiency of enforcement, parents should have
access to the courts to enforce child support orders against each other.24 A
16. See, e.g., id. at 53, [1] (noting that the appellant attempted to sue her former husband for
support directly because she was unable to recover the full amount owed to her through the Child
Support Agency).
17. Id. at 68, [45].
18. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FY2011 PRELIMINARY REPORT (2012) [hereinafter FY2011 PRELIMINARY REPORT],
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/resource/fy2011-preliminary-report.
19. COMM. PUB. ACCOUNTS, CHILD MAINTENANCE & ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION: COST
REDUCTIONS, 2010–12, H.C. 1874, at Ev. 2 (U.K.), available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk
/docs/cmec-report-and-accounts-11-12.pdf. The United Kingdom has contemplated charging
parents to use the CSA. Id. at Ev. 4 (“[T]he Minister has said that the cost of a typical case is
£25,000 over the lifetime of a child using the CSA and it is therefore fair to introduce
charging. . . .”).
20. Id. at 16.
21. CHILD SUPPORT: 2009, supra note 1, at 9. This is a decrease from 76.3% in 2007.
CHILD SUPPORT: 2007, supra note 1, at 1.
22. FY2011 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 18.
23. COMM. PUB. ACCOUNTS, supra note 19.
24. There are many well-discussed collateral issues to child support that fall beyond the
scope of this Article. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues
and Perils of Child-Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2577 (1995) (arguing that
increased enforcement of child support will have “negative consequences [that] would be borne
disproportionately by the poorest persons and by persons of color”); J. Brad Reich & Dawn
Swink, You Can’t Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights and Obligations of Egg
Donors in the Cybyerprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2010) (considering the child
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comparative analysis of the U.S. and U.K. approaches illustrates the
characteristics of a system that recognizes and validates the personal
consequences to parents seeking child support.25 Furthermore, to the extent
possible under federal law, there should be some judicial oversight of the
state agencies responsible for overseeing child support. In the alternative,
states should institute a review mechanism to hold noncustodial parents
accountable for the failure to fulfill their support responsibilities.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article reviews the law of child support
collection in the United States. Part II considers the corresponding law in
the United Kingdom. Finally, Part III compares the U.S. and U.K.
enforcement systems and highlights the important role courts play in child
support enforcement and the consequences of increasing judicial
involvement.
I. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, child support enforcement “[has] progressed from
private, to state, then to federal remedies.”26 Much of this change is the
result of the major demographic shifts in the structure of the American
family.27 Today, both parents and the state are often parties to child
support enforcement actions.28
A. State Enforcement of Child Support Obligations
Before the rise in the number of children born out of wedlock or to
parents whowould eventually divorce, parents served as the primary

support obligations of donors and recipients of genetic material for procreative purposes); Sara R.
David, Note, Turning Parental Rights into Parental Obligations—Holding Same-Sex,
Non–Biological Parents Responsible for Child Support, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 921 (2005)
(discussing child support responsibilities following same-sex unions).
25. For the separate issue of international child support, specifically the collection of child
support payments across country boundaries, see Michael J. Peters, International Child Support:
The United States Striving Towards a Better Solution, 15 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 91
(2009).
26. WALTER WADLINGTON & RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN, FAMILY LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 129
(3d ed. 2012).
27. See infra Part III. (discussing the changing dynamics of the American family).
28. This Article considers “parent” to include both the custodial parent of the child and the
noncustodial parent, although the definition of the term “parenthood” could potentially change.
See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Harriet Anticzac & Mark Musico, Family Law Scholarship Goes
to Court: Functional Parenthood and the Case of Debra H. v. Janice R., 20 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 348, 349 (2011) (considering whether the law should recognize the rights of a person who
“functions” as a parent but who has no biological or adoptive connection to the child).
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financial supporters of minor children.29 Indeed, while friends and
extended family may have provided financial support to parents in need,
there was recourse through the courts to recover the loan once the parents
were able to pay.30 Additionally, most American states enacted poor laws,
which were based on the Elizabethan Poor Law in England.31 However,
the fundamental principle of family law was that courts refused to intervene
in the matters of an intact family unless the parents neglected or abused
their children.32
By the twentieth century, almost all states had enacted civil statutes
requiring parents to support their children, which prompted the question of
who had standing to enforce support obligations.33 Most statutes
specifically identified who had standing; some statutes even empowered
children to enforce their parents’ obligations.34 Other statutes did not
address the question of standing.35 Rather, courts enforced support
obligations under the doctrine of necessaries, which stemmed from the
common law duty of a husband to provide for the necessary expenses of his
wife and children.36
Modern child support disputes begin in state court after one parent,
usually the custodial parent seeking to offset the costs of raising the child,
sues the other parent for support.37 Alternatively, the state child support
29. See Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal
Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 314 (2008) (noting that only 3.8% of children were born to unwed
parents in 1940, compared to 33.8% in 2002).
30. Donna Schuele, Origins and Development of the Law of Parental Child Support, 27 J.
FAM. L. 807, 809–10 (1988-89) (noting that a third party could seek reimbursement through the
courts for providing “necessaries” to the child).
31. Id. at 809 (describing the dual function of poor laws: (1) to codify a mechanism by
which relief could be provided to the poor; and (2) identifying individuals responsible for
reimbursing the government).
32. See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885, 888–89 (Ala. 1958) (holding that the
Alabama Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over a dispute between two parents about their
child’s education because “the parents and child [were] all living together as a family group”).
33. See 4 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 234, at 56–58 (1936).
34. Id. (arguing that statutes that specifically delineate the extent of parents’ liability are
preferable because “any serious danger of officious intermeddling by private persons is
avoided”).
35. Id. at 57–58.
36. Id. at 56; see also Susan Kalinka, Taxation of Community Income: It Is Time for
Congress to Override Poe v. Seaborn, 58 LA. L. REV. 73, 94 (1997) (“Under the doctrine of
necessaries, the earning spouse is responsible for payment of expenses incurred by the nonearning
spouse for those things that are necessary for the family.”). Whether an expense is “necessary” is
determined by evaluating the means, social position, and circumstances of both parents. Id.
37. See, e.g., Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 203 (Wash. 1978) (reviewing a child
support order that originated in an action brought by the custodial parent against the noncustodial
parent). However, in Colonna v. Colonna, 855 A.2d 648, 649–51 (Pa. 2004), the non-custodial
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agency may initiate action on behalf of the custodial parent.38 In addition,
both parents and the relevant state agency also have standing to modify
child support orders.39
Consequently, state governments play a significant role in child support
collection,40 and states have become more creative and aggressive in their
enforcement efforts.41
Enforcement techniques range from lighter
penalties, such as the suspension of recreational licenses or the loss of a
work permit, to severe sanctions, such as criminal prosecution and
incarceration.42

parent sued the custodial parent for child support to maintain a certain standard of living for the
children when they visited the noncustodial parent. See also Jill Lipman, Recent Decision: A
Parent with Primary Custody of the Couple’s Children May Be Ordered to Pay Child Support to
a Parent with Partial Custody Under Pennsylvania Law: Colonna v. Colonna, 43 DUQ. L. REV.
481, 494–95 (2005) (expecting Colonna to open the litigation floodgates for lower-income,
noncustodial parents, which in turn transformed recovery under child support guidelines into a
“crapshoot”).
38. HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, Section 8: Child Support Enforcement Program, in
2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 8-1, 8-2 (2004).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(b) (2006) (defining “contestants” in a child support order as
persons, including a parent, state, or political subdivision of a state).
40. See, e.g., Margaret Wrenn Hickey, Administrative Enforcement: A New Tool to Collect
Support Arrears, WIS. LAW., Dec. 1998, at 15 (1998) (noting that, in order to collect child
support, Wisconsin has “the right to suspend, revoke, limit, or refuse to renew many licenses and
the right to levy or take a lien against property held by the payer”); William W. Van Alstyne,
Denying Due Process in the Florida Courts: A Commentary on the 1994 Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act of Florida, 46 FLA. L. REV. 563, 570 & n.24 (1995) (describing how a number of
state welfare departments are “entitled by statute” to sue to recover child support payments).
41. See, e.g., Bobby L. Dexter, Transfiguration of the Deadbeat Dad and the Greedy
Octogenarian: An Intratextualist Critique of Tax Refund Seizures, 54 KAN. L. REV. 643, 644 &
n.9 (explaining how several states have worked with Congress and the U.S. Department of
Treasury to collect owed child support).
42. Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor
Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 1000 (2006); see also Margaret Campbell Haynes & Peter
S. Feliceangeli, Child Support in the Year 2000, 3 DEL. L. REV. 65, 89 (2000) (explaining
Delaware’s ability to suspend recreation, driving, and professional licenses); Elizabeth Warren,
The New Economy and the Unraveling Social Safety Net: The Growing Threat to Middle Class
Families, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 410 & n.27 (2004) (noting that parents behind on child support
payments may lose their driver’s licenses or work permits). For an in-depth treatment of license
revocation for child support enforcement purposes, see Mark R. Fondacaro & Dennis P. Stolle,
Revoking Motor Vehicle and Professional Licenses for Purposes of Child Support Enforcement:
Constitutional Challenges and Policy Implications, 5 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 355 (1996);
and Mai M. Petersen, Modification and Enforcement of Support: Enforcing Child Support by
Revoking Licenses: How Constitutional Is It?, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 441 (2000). But
see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin law that denied
marriage licenses to parents with unpaid child support obligations).
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Imprisonment continues to be the most serious penalty a state imposes on
parents who fail to pay child support. For example, a Massachusetts study
found that parents who had been incarcerated for failing to meet their child
support obligations owed an average of $10,543 in support.43 Furthermore,
because a parent’s child support obligations do not change if he or she is in
prison, the study predicted that parents incarcerated in Massachusetts
would generate an additional $20,461 in debt while serving their prison
sentences, plus 12% interest and 6% penalties.44
In Turner v. Rogers, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether
indigent parents are entitled to state-appointed counsel when they face
incarceration for failing to pay child support.45 The case arose as a result of
the Family Court of South Carolina’s practice of enforcing child support
orders with the threat of incarceration for civil contempt.46 The petitioner
was one such parent who was imprisoned for failing to pay child support.47
The issue in the case was whether the Due Process Clause granted an
indigent defendant, such as the petitioner, a right to state-appointed counsel
at a civil contempt proceeding that could result in his imprisonment for up
to a year.48 The Court held that due process did not require the state to
provide counsel in such circumstances.49 However, the Court also held that
the state nonetheless must conduct contempt proceedings fairly.50 The
Court noted that the particular circumstances surrounding petitioner’s
contempt proceeding violated due process, concluding that “[h]e did not
43. NANCY W. THOENNES, CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH, CHILD SUPPORT PROFILE:
MASSACHUSETTS INCARCERATED AND PAROLED PARENTS 27 (2002), available at
http://cntrpolres.qwestoffice.net/reports/profile%20of%20CS%20among%20incarcerated
%20&%20paroled%20parents.pdf.
44. Id. at 20, 27. Critics have deplored the modern day debtors’ prison created as a result.
See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The
Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 117–18 (2008) (noting that
the majority of parents with child support debts are indigent or otherwise unable to pay); Richard
E. James, Note, Putting Fear Back Into the Law and Debtors Back Into Prison: Reforming the
Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 149 (2002) (describing a “de facto debtors’
prison system” that has developed to address debt).
45. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2515–16, 2520 (2011). For arguments in support of
indigent parents’ right to counsel, see Brief for Constitution Project as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 22–23, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10), available at http://www.
scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/AmConstProj.10-10.pdf.
46. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512–13.
47. Id. at 2513.
48. Id. at 2512.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2519–20 (requiring the state court to provide “alternative procedural safeguards,”
such as “adequate notice of the importance of ability to pay, fair opportunity to present, and to
dispute, relevant information and court findings”).
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receive clear notice that his ability to pay would constitute the critical
question in his civil contempt proceeding.”51
As Turner illustrates, states have become more aggressive in enforcing
child support, often involving the courts and utilizing federal money.
However, states have not yet achieved full success in child support
enforcement. The initial process of locating the noncustodial parent,52
establishing paternity,53 and initiating child support proceedings54 is
difficult, and the enforcement of orders and collection of support pose their
own special issues.55 Additionally, although it is difficult to estimate the
total cost of child support enforcement, state expenditures alone are high.
For example, in 2006, state child support programs spent approximately
$5.6 billion to collect $23.9 billion in child support.56 For every dollar of
administrative expense, states collected $4.30 in owed support.57
Furthermore, combined federal-state collection programs employed
approximately 60,000 people.58
B. Federal Enforcement of Child Support Obligations
The federal government began its oversight of child support enforcement
with Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a federal program
created by the Social Security Act of 1935.59 The purpose of this provision
of the Act was to provide state funding to “needy dependent children.”60 In
51. Id. at 2511.
52. See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1668 & n.246
(2002) (describing an absent noncustodial parent as an “obvious example” of nationwide
problems concerning child support enforcement).
53. See Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the
Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 253 (2006) (footnote omitted) (“Although DNA
technology was envisioned as a tool to establish paternity without the need for judicial
involvement, it has been eagerly embraced by litigants who seek to disestablish their status as
legal parents.”).
54. See Haynes & Feliceangeli, supra note 42, at 74.
55. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
56. HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, supra note 38, at 8-5.
57. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FY2006 PRELIMINARY REPORT 1–2 (2007), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs
/cse/pubs/2007/preliminary_report/. Additionally, “1.7 million paternities were established or
acknowledged; almost 1.2 million support orders were established; and 8.5 million cases had
collections” in 2006. Id.
58. Id. This figure marks an increase of almost 50% from the $2.89 collected per dollar of
administrative cost in 1982. Id. The figure improved to $5.12 in fiscal year 2011. FY2011
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 18, at 4.
59. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, tit. IV, 49 Stat. 620, 627–29 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–06 (2006 & Supp. 2012)).
60. § 401, 49 Stat. at 627.
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1950, Congress amended the AFDC to require state welfare agencies to
notify enforcement officials if a child continued to receive benefits under
the program after being abandoned by his or her parents.61 The Act then
empowered state officials to search for the child’s parents and require them
to fulfill their child support obligations.62 From 1950 to 1975, the federal
government limited its child support efforts to holding the parents of
abandoned children accountable for support.63
By that time, the composition of the AFDC caseload had changed.
Before this shift, most children required public financial assistance because
their parents had died.64 However, by the 1970s, most children needed
financial support because their parents had never married or had since
separated or divorced.65 The AFDC aided these children by funding state
programs to establish paternity, to locate absent parents, and to aid families
in receiving support orders.66
To qualify for federal funds under the framework, a state had to certify
that it created a child support enforcement program that met the
requirements in Title IV–D of the Social Security Act and was approved by
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).67 If
the state was successful, the federal government then agreed to underwrite
approximately two-thirds of the costs the state incurred through the
program.68
State governments provided enforcement services automatically to
AFDC recipients and to all other custodial parents for a small fee.69 The
state often required AFDC recipients to assign their rights to the state and
to cooperate fully with the state’s program in order to benefit from the
state’s enforcement efforts.70 In the early days of the AFDC program, the
state retained most of the money it collected on behalf of AFDC recipients,
with the exception of the $50 of each payment the law required the state to

61. HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, supra note 38, at 8-5.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 654 (1994) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 654 (2006
& Supp. 2012)).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(2), 652(a)(3) (1994) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(2),
652(a)(3) (2006)).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1) (1994) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1) (2006)).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 654(4), (6) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 654 (2006)).
70. See infra Part III.B.2.
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set aside to help offset welfare costs.71 However, an amended version of
Title IV–D distributed a larger portion of the collected funds to families
that left the welfare system.72 Conversely, non-AFDC recipients who
utilized the state’s enforcement programs received all of the money the
state collected on their behalf.73 As one commentator described the AFDC
program, “[w]here the mother receives public aid, federal and state
governments will provide the child support payment to the mother and hold
the father indebted to the government for that amount. In cases where the
mother is not dependent on welfare, the government has largely stayed out
of the fray.”74
Modern child support law has aimed to combat poverty and reduce
welfare costs.75 In 1975, Congress enacted the Child Support Enforcement
and Paternity Establishment Program (CSE Program) under Title IV-D of
the Social Security Act.76 The CSE Program is a federal-state partnership
that aims to increase the rate of child support collection.77 To accomplish
this goal, the legislation envisioned a more effective child support
collection system that was designed to deter parents from abandoning their
children, which would in turn lower welfare costs for taxpayers.78
Amendments to the legislation also authorized child support agencies to
seek medical support as part of child support orders and to collect spousal
support for custodial parents.79
Among the CSE Program’s most successful enforcement tools is the
income withholding order, which automatically deducts delinquent child

71. 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1) (1994) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1) (2006 & Supp.
2012)).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2012) (“To the extent that the amount collected
does not exceed the current support amount, the State shall pay the amount to the family.”).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. 2012). The AFDC required the state to distribute
the funds within two days of receiving them. 42 U.S.C. § 654b(c)(1) (2006).
74. Reginald Mombrun, An End to the Deadbeat Dad Dilemma?–Puncturing the Paradigm
by Allowing a Deduction for Child Support Payments, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 211, 217
(2008) (citations omitted).
75. See, e.g., Estin, supra note 5, at 505 (“Much of the motivation for the enormous national
effort and expense devoted to the child support revolution was the promise that better support
enforcement would help keep single-parent families off the welfare rolls and allow the
government to recoup its growing expenditures for public benefits.”).
76. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101, 88 Stat. 2337, 2351
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–52 (2006)).
77. S. REP. NO. 93-1356, at 46 (1974).
78. Id. at 42, 46, 49–50.
79. See HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, supra note 38, at 8-2.
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support from the debtor parent’s wages.80 Income withholding has allowed
child support enforcement agencies to collect 68% of owed support,
approximately $21.9 billion.81 Similarly, Congress also authorized the
direct seizure of pending income tax refunds as a means of reaching the
assets of debtor parents.82
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which replaced AFDC and its related
programs with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
block grant program.83 Assistance under TANF is time-limited and
encourages employment and self-sufficiency.84 Under the Act, each state
must establish a child support enforcement program that meets federal CSE
standards to receive TANF funds.85 Congress used this legislation to
encourage states to establish paternity and to hold absentee parents
accountable for child support obligations by withholding TANF funds from
those states that failed to establish effective CSE programs.86 The 1996
legislation also withheld funding if the state failed to include an
employment requirement in its enforcement program, the goal of which
was to prevent custodial parents from relying on welfare resources for their
entire incomes.87 However, despite these efforts to improve state
programs, “[t]here is considerable evidence that reforms have failed to

80. Quick Facts: Child Support Enforcement, NAT’L CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ASS’N
http://www.ncsea.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Enforcement-of-Child-Support-Orders-Quick
-Facts.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). Debtor parents cannot avoid the order by changing jobs
because states are able to track this information. Id.
81. Id.
82. Dexter, supra note 41, at 645 (reporting that “[c]hild-support-related refund seizures
have resulted in the collection of billions of dollars of revenue”).
83. HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, supra note 38, at 8-3; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-725,
at 261, 263 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that the Act “put[] in place the most fundamental reform
of welfare since the program’s inception”).
84. Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate
in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 805 (2005) (describing TANF as a “time-limited
program that requires ‘workfare’ or job training participations as conditions of eligibility”); About
TANF, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMS. ARCHIVES, http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa
/tanf/about.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (noting that TANF’s mission is “to help needy
families achieve self-sufficiency”).
85. HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, supra note 38, at 8-3.
86. Harris, supra note 2, at 157 (criticizing this legislation on the grounds that it does not
improve noncustodial parents’ involvement in the family and has not achieved the elimination of
child poverty).
87. See id. at 158 (explaining that welfare reform rejected the traditional assumption that
women would stay home to care for their children, instead assuming that all parents would work
outside of the home and therefore could support their children without public assistance).

2013]

Two Direct Rights of Action in Child Support Enforcement

1019

accomplish one of the most important objectives of child support, that of
reducing child poverty.”88
In 2005, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act, which required
families not previously enrolled in the TANF program to pay a $25 fee for
each year the state’s CSE program collected more than $500 in child
support on their behalf.89 The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 also
reauthorized federal TANF funding through 2010.90
By 2006, approximately 70% of families eligible for child support
utilized government-funded enforcement services.91 Accordingly, in May
2006, the Office of Family Assistance established the TANF Bureau to
administer the various programs authorized under Titles IV-A and XVI of
the Social Security Act.92 The Bureau assists families by providing states
with the funding necessary to develop and implement their own welfare
programs.93
To oversee this complicated federal-state enterprise—and to manage the
federal government’s role as creditor94—Congress created the
Administration for Children and Families, Office of Child Support
Enforcement (OSCE) within HHS.95 The OSCE oversees federal programs
that “promote[] the economic and social well-being of families, children,
individuals and communities.”96 Specifically, the OSCE enforces child
support payments and audits states’ compliance with their federally
approved child support enforcement plans.97

88. J. THOMAS OLDHAM & MARYGOLD S. MELLI, CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER ix
(2000).
89. H.R. REP. NO. 109-362, at 148 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
90. Id. at 135.
91. HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, supra note 38, at 8-5.
92. About TANF, supra note 84.
93. Id. (“To carry out its mission, the TANF Bureau: 1) develops legislative, regulatory, and
budgetary proposals; 2) presents operational planning objectives and initiatives related to welfare
reform to the Director; 3) oversees the progress of approved activities; 4) provides leadership and
coordination for welfare reform within ACF; and 5) provides leadership and linkages with other
agencies on welfare reform issues, including agencies within DHHS, relevant agencies across the
Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments, and non-governmental organizations at the Federal,
State, and local levels.”).
94. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining that families assign their support
enforcement rights to the state in exchange for welfare benefits).
95. Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 42, at 360 n.19.
96. About the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), ADMIN. OF CHILDREN
& FAMS., http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/css/about (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
97. Id. (noting that the OCSE works with state enforcement agencies to help them
administer their programs effectively).
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The OCSE does not work in isolation. Instead, the OCSE collaborates
with various federal and local agencies to ensure the success and efficiency
of child support collection.98 The OSCE works together with these
agencies to locate parents, establish paternity, and enforce child support
orders.99
In terms of calculating the amount of child support for which
noncustodial parents are responsible, federal law encourages states to
promulgate rules that specify the dollar amount awarded in each case.100
To determine the amount of the award, most states dictate “child support
guidelines,” which are tables that calculate an adequate award based on the
parents’ gross income and the number of children who require support.101
However, despite this standardization, it is difficult to predict how much
raising or supporting a child will cost and to divide that speculative amount
between the child’s parents.102
II. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Child support enforcement began in the United Kingdom with the British
Poor Laws of 1576, which imposed a duty of support on the fathers of non
-marital children if both the child and the child’s mother received some
type of public assistance.103 The Laws empowered justices of the peace to
seek reimbursement of public funds from a child’s biological father.104

98. Id. (explaining that OCSE collaborates with federal, state, tribal, and local
governments).
99. Id.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(a)–b) (2006) (“Each State, as a condition for having its State plan
approved under this part, must establish guidelines for child support award amounts within the
State. The guidelines may be established by law or by judicial or administrative action, and shall
be reviewed at least once every 4 years to ensure that their application results in the determination
of appropriate child support award amounts.”). For an excellent background on these guidelines,
and Arizona’s position, see Ira Mark Ellman, A Case Study in Failed Law Reform: Arizona’s
Child Support Guidelines, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 137 (2012).
101. Douglas W. Allen & Margaret F. Brinig, Child Support Guidelines: The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly, 45 FAM. L.Q. 135, 136–37 (2011) (using Virginia’s child support guidelines as an
example).
102. Id. at 138–41 (describing the many variables that factor in to estimating the cost of
raising a child and how that cost should be shared by the child’s parents).
103. Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law
and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2004) (tracking the establishment of
the duty to support); Veronica Sue Gunderson, Personal Responsibility in Parentage: An
Argument Against the Marital Presumption, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 335, 337 (2007)
(explaining that the duty applied only if the child and mother were receiving public assistance).
104. Baker, supra note 103.
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Unwed mothers who did not receive public assistance did not have the right
to sue the child’s father for support until 1844.105
By the 1980s, the United Kingdom had enacted a patchwork of laws to
govern child support enforcement, including the Matrimonial Causes Act
1973, the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978, the
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, and the Children Act
1989.106 This collection of enforcement statutes allowed a custodial parent
to sue the noncustodial parent directly for support.107
However, by the 1990s, critics of this system considered its patchwork of
laws to be “fragmented,” overly “discretion[ary],” “inconsistent,” and
“ineffective.”108 In response, Parliament enacted the Child Support Act
1991 to replace the piecemeal framework.109 The Act established the Child
Support Agency (CSA), a centralized body that assumed responsibility
for“the assessment, review, collection, and enforcement of maintenance
payments.”110 The CSA had the power “to collect information on incomes
and obligations, make a legally binding assessment of what amount of
[support] was payable, determine methods of payment, monitor and (where
necessary) collect maintenance and enforce payment where payments
failed.”111 Importantly, the CSA—rather than the courts—managed all
child support issues and disputes; the 1991 Act intended to reduce judicial
involvement in the child support system.112 According to the House of
105. Id.
106. See R (Kehoe) v. Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, [2005] UKHL 48 [2006] 1 A.C.
(H.L.) 54, [3] (appeal taken from Eng.) (listing the various statutes under which the appellant
could seek enforcement of her former spouse’s child support obligations).
107. Id. at 53–54, [3] (explaining that, before 1991, the patchwork of laws allowed for a
direct suit against a noncustodial parent to recover “‘child maintenance’”).
108. Id. at 54, [3]. A White Paper presented to Parliament noted that
[t]he present system of maintenance is unnecessarily fragmented, uncertain in its
results, slow and ineffective. It is based largely on discretion. The system is operated
through the High and county courts, the magistrates’ courts, the Court of Session and
the Sheriff Courts in Scotland and the offices of the Department of Social Security.
The cumulative effect is uncertainty and inconsistent decisions about how much
maintenance should be paid. In a great many instances, the maintenance awarded is
not paid or the payments fall into arrears and take weeks to re-establish. Only 30 per
cent of lone mothers and 3 per cent of lone fathers receive regular maintenance for
their children. More than 750,000 lone parents depend on Income Support. Many lone
mothers want to go to work but do not feel able to do so.
Id. (quoting DEP’TOF SOC. SEC., CHILDREN COME FIRST, 1990, Cm. 1264, ¶2 (U.K).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (noting that it was “important that, as far as possible, all the services relating to child
maintenance provided to the public should be delivered by one single authority, the CSA”).
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Lords, the reduction of judicial involvement was not an “inadvertent
omission,” but rather a “deliberate legislative departure” from the previous
system.113 However, even under the Act, parents remained free to reach
private support agreements, so long as the caring [custodial] parent did not
also receive state benefits.114
The case of Kehoe v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions provided
an opportunity for U.K. courts to interpret and clarify the scope and reach
of the 1991 Act.115 The appellant, Mrs. Kehoe, a divorced mother of four
children, was attempting to obtain child support from her former
husband.116 Following the end of the marriage, Mrs. Kehoe became the
custodial parent of the four children.117 For the next ten years, Mrs. Kehoe
attempted to obtain child support from Mr. Kehoe through the CSA.118 Mr.
Kehoe paid a “significant” amount of the due support following the CSA’s
involvement, but, as the court noted, “the process of obtaining payment
was protracted and difficult and substantial arrears built up from time to
time.”119
Failing to collect all the support due to her through the CSA, Mrs. Kehoe
filed a lawsuit alleging that a direct action against Mr. Kehoe would allow
her to recover a larger amount of support.120 She contended that, by
refusing her the right to judicial enforcement against Mr. Kehoe, the Child
Support Act 1991 conflicted with Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which guarantees a right of access to the courts.121
The House of Lords dismissed the appeal, holding that Article 6 of the
Convention did not apply to the case.122 Specifically, the court explained
that Article 6 guarantees “procedural safeguards in the exercise of rights
accorded by national law,” but does not “require that particular substantive
rights be accorded by national law.”123 Had the law given Mrs. Kehoe a
right of recovery against Mr. Kehoe, Article 6 would “guarantee her access
113. Id. at 57, [6] (explaining that, in passing the 1991 Act, Parliament purposely abolished
the previous system).
114. Id. at 55, [3].
115. Id. at 53, [1] (describing the issue on appeal as whether Mrs. Kehoe had a right to
directly recover child support payments from her former husband under the Child Support Act
1991).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 57, [8].
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to an impartial and independent court.”124 However, Article 6 itself does
not grant such a right of recovery.125 The House of Lords though did leave
open the possibility of a suit against the CSA or its administrators.126
Mrs. Kehoe appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, which
concluded that she could seek relief by initiating judicial review
proceedings against the CSA or the Secretary of State for failing to
properly enforce Mr. Kehoe’s support obligations.127 The court rejected
Mrs. Kehoe’s argument that this process was too onerous to be effective.128
The court also deferred to the United Kingdom’s child support system,
explaining that the United Kingdom did not violate Article 6 simply
because a different system could provide a more efficient direct right of
action.129 In fact, the court commended the U.K. system precisely because
it placed the burden of pursuing absent parents on the state rather than on
the custodial parent.130
Despite the judicial confidence in the United Kingdom’s child support
system, the CSA was not completely successful; in thirteen years, the
agency accrued £3.4 billion in unrecovered support payments.131

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 68–69, [45]–[48]. Although there is no comparable right of action in the United
States, courts have considered allowing custodial parents to sue child support enforcement
agencies. See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617, 619 (1973) (holding that a
mother did not have standing to sue a prosecutor to enforce child support payment laws because
of the “unique context of a challenge to a criminal statute” and the “special status of criminal
prosecutions in our system”); Jager v. Alameda, 8 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 294, 297 (Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. 1992) (rejecting a mother’s lawsuit against the family support division of the county’s
District Attorney’s Office for negligence in its attempts to obtain child support because there was
no attorney-client relationship between the mother and the office).
127. Case of Kehoe v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 2010/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 9-12, [44] –[50]
(2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22kehoe%22
],%22documentcollectionid%22:[%22COMMITTEE%22,%22DECISIONS%22,%22COMMUNI
CATEDCASES%22,%22CLIN%22,%22ADVISORYOPINIONS%22,%22REPORTS%22,%22
RESOLUTIONS%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-86980%22]}.
128. Id. at 10–11, [47]–[48].
129. Id.
130. Id. (noting that vesting control in the state “benefits the many parents with care of
children who do not have the time, energy, resources or inclination to be embroiled in ongoing
litigation with the absent parent and allows the State to pursue those absent parents who default
on their obligations leaving their families on the charge of the social security system and the
taxpayer”).
131. See, e.g., Jon Robins, Mother Challenges CSA ‘Negligence’, GUARDIAN (May 20,
2006),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2006/may/21/observercashsection.theobserver?INT
CMP. For excellent background on child support reform in the United Kingdom, see Nick
Wikeley, Child Support Reform in the United Kingdom, http://www.uea.ac.uk/swp/iccd
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Consequently, Parliament passed the Child Maintenance and Other
Payments Act 2008, which established the Child Maintenance and
Enforcement Commission (CMEC), a non-departmental public body that
oversaw the United Kingdom’s child maintenance system.132 The CMEC
had three main functions: “[1] promoting the financial responsibility that
parents who live apart have for their children; [2] providing information
and support to help parents make effective maintenance arrangements; and
[3] providing an efficient statutory child maintenance service with effective
enforcement.”133 By the summer of 2012, the CMEC had failed: the
agency received 23,000 complaints and cost £450 million per year, but 1.5
million children were still not receiving adequate support.134 Therefore, the
United Kingdom abandoned the CMEC in July of 2012.135
On July 31, 2012, Parliament promulgated a new enforcement scheme,
which transferred responsibility from the CMEC back to the Department
for Work and Pensions, now called the Child Maintenance Service.136 The
Child Maintenance Service is currently working to establish the parameters
of the new system.137 It remains to be seen whether this enforcement
scheme will be effective. Although the framework is new, it is an
alternative to the American system, especially in regard to the direct right
of action against the government.

2006/Presentations/tues_pm/ps3%20Child%20support%20reform/Wikeley%20ppt.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 16, 2013).
132. 3 July 2012, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2012) 3 (U.K.), available at http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmgeneral/deleg11/120703/120703s01.htm (noting that
the primary function of the CMEC was “to maximise the number of effective maintenance
arrangements in place for children who live apart from one or both of their parents”).
133. Id. CMEC had two delivery bodies, which employed 8,000 staff: (1) Child Maintenance
Options, which provided free and impartial information and support services and (2) the Child
Support Agency. Id.
134. Id. (arguing that the CMEC did not “achieve its mission in life”).
135. Id. at 5 (“[T]he CMEC will be abolished and no longer exist as a separate legal
organisation.”).
136. See id. (explaining that the CMEC’s responsibilities and staff will transfer to the
Department for Work and Pensions); DEP’T FOR WORK AND PENSIONS, PUBLIC CONSULTATION
SUPPORTING SEPARATING FAMILIES; SECURING CHILDREN’S FUTURES, 2012, Cm. 8399, at 7,
Annex
A
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/childrens-futures
-consultation.pdf.
137. DEP’T FOR WORK AND PENSIONS, supra note 136, at Annex A (describing the phases of
development of the Child Maintenance Service).
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III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Although the enforcement mechanisms in both countries originate from
the English Poor laws,138 the United Kingdom and United State have each
devised different systems to provide access to the judiciary and a direct
right of action in the child support enforcement context.139 Neither
jurisdiction has yet developed an efficient and successful child support
system.
The United Kingdom has centralized collection efforts and prohibited
direct action by custodial parents against defaulting noncustodial parents
with the CSA, but at the same time permitted a direct action against the
government for failing to enforce support obligations.140 Conversely, the
United States allows one parent to sue the other parent directly to enforce
support responsibilities (unless one parent receives welfare benefits), but
does not allow suits against the enforcement agency.141
Improvement to both systems is necessary, especially to accommodate
the changing demographics of the modern family. By comparing the two
systems, improvements can be targeted to maximize child support
enforcement in both countries, while at the same time protecting the rights
of parents and their children.
A. The Changing Demographics of the Modern Family
Today, almost all child support in the United States is ordered for
children of divorced or never-married parents.142 Currently, the divorce
rate is nearly 50%,143 and 40.8% of children are born to unmarried
138. See supra notes 31, 103, and accompanying text.
139. Compare Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 332–33 (1997) (holding that custodial
parents do not have a right to sue a state agency for the failure to enforce child support
obligations), with Case of Kehoe v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 2010/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 10,
[46]–[47] (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22
kehoe%22],%22documentcollectionid%22:[%22COMMITTEE%22,%22DECISIONS%22,%22C
OMMUNICATEDCASES%22,%22CLIN%22,%22ADVISORYOPINIONS%22,%22REPORTS
%22,%22RESOLUTIONS%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-86980%22]} (noting that the United
Kingdom allows custodial parents to seek judicial review of the CSA’s efforts to enforce
maintenance payments).
140. See supra notes 112–114, 120–126, and accompanying text (discussing the avenues of
relief in the United Kingdom).
141. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (discussing the avenues of relief in the
United States); Blessing, 520 U.S. at 332–33 (prohibiting a direct action against state child
support enforcement agencies).
142. WADLINGTON & O’BRIEN, supra note 26, at 129.
143. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., 52 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS: BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, AND
DEATHS: PROVISIONAL DATA FOR 2003 1 (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr
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parents.144 The consequence of these changing demographics is that many
children are entitled support from a noncustodial parent.
Most single parents in the United States are women over the age of
twenty.145 Indeed, in 2010, single-parent households headed by women
numbered 8,365,912, which constituted 7.2% of American households.146
By contrast, single-parent households headed by men numbered 2,789,424
in 2010, 4.2% of American households.147 Similarly, although unmarried
couples with children made up 6.6% of households in 2010 (approximately
7,744,711 households in total), these couples had a 90% chance of
separating if they did not marry within five years.148
By comparison, in the past ten years, 40% of children in the United
Kingdom were born to unmarried parents, a sharp increase from 12% in
1980 and 6% in 1960.149 Many of these children were born to unmarried
parents that cohabit. For example, 25% of the children in the Millennium
Cohort Study—a survey that tracks 18,800 children who were born in the

/nvsr52/nvsr52_22.pdf (reporting that there were 3.8 divorces per every 7.5 marriages in 2003);
Margaret Berger Strickland, Comment, What’s Mine Is Mine: Reserving the Fruits of Separate
Property Without Notice to the Unsuspecting Spouse, 51 LOY. L. REV. 989, 990 (2005) (“[I]n
2003, for every two marriages, there was a divorce.”).
144. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., 61 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS: BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, AND
DEATHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2010 10 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr
/nvsr61/nvsr61_01.pdf. This figure marked a decrease in children born out of wedlock for the
second consecutive year; the number of births to unmarried parents peaked at 1,726,566 in 2008.
Id.
145. Id. Most unmarried mothers have reached adulthood; in 2010, only 20% of non-marital
births were to teenagers, compared to 28% in 2000. Id.
146. DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010 5
(2012) available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.
147. Id.
148. Anna Stȩpieñ-Sporek & Margaret Ryznar, The Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in
Poland and the United States, 79 UMKC L. REV. 373, 373 (2010) (noting that, after five years,
only 10% of unmarried, cohabiting couples remain together); see also Margaret F. Brinig
& Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: Should Cohabitation Be the (Legal) Default Option?, 64 LA.
L. REV. 403, 409 (2004) (explaining that cohabiting couples report feeling less committed to their
relationships and, further, that cohabitation before marriage reduces the couple’s chances of
future marital success); William C. Duncan, The Social Good of Marriage and Legal Responses
to Non-Marital Cohabitation, 82 OR. L. REV. 1001, 1005–13 (2003) (arguing that cohabiting
partners are less faithful to each other, less happy, less wealthy, and less stable than married
couples).
149. Éva Beaujouan & Máire Ní Bhrolcháin, Cohabitation and Marriage in Britain Since the
1970s, in OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, POPULAR TRENDS 35, 44 (Chris W. Smith ed., 2011).
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United Kingdom at the turn of the twenty-first century—were born to
parents who cohabit but are not married.150
The divorce rate in the United Kingdom has also increased in recent
years. The number of divorces rose by 4.9% in 2010, a year in which there
were 241,100 marriages151 and 132,223 divorces.152 Half of couples who
divorced in 2010 had at least one child younger than sixteen, for a total of
104,364 children affected by divorce that year.153 This represents a 27%
decrease from the number of children whose parents divorced in 2000.154
However, the decrease may reflect that an increasing number of children
are born to cohabiting, rather than married, couples.
Children of unmarried and divorced parents in both the United Kingdom
and the United States face the same disadvantages, such as limited financial
resources.155 For example, in the United States, almost 25% of single
custodial parents have incomes below the poverty level, 18.2% of which
receive some type of child support.156 Interestingly, one study suggests that
children of unmarried parents face greater financial obstacles than children

150. Kathleen Kiernan & Kate Smith, Unmarried Parenthood: New Insights from the
Millennium Cohort Study, in OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, POPULAR TRENDS 26, 27 (2003).
151. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, DIVORCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES 2010 1–2 (2012)
[hereinafter DIVORCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES], available at http://www.ons.gov.uk
/ons/dcp171778_246403.pdf.
152. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, MARRIAGES IN ENGLAND AND WALES 2010 1, 8
(2011), available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_258307.pdf.
153. DIVORCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 151, at 7 (noting that 21% of these
children were under 5 years of age, and 64% were under 11 years of age).
154. Id. (reporting that 142,457 children were affected by divorce in 2000).
155. Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective, 34 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 6 (1995) (explaining that, in 1993, the mean income for divorced
American mothers was $17,859, but $31,034 for divorced fathers); see also Margaret F. Brinig,
Contracting Around No-Fault Divorce, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 275,
277 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (arguing that children of divorced parents “will be worse off,” “may
lose out,” and “will be poorer than those of intact families”). But see Kelly Bedard & Olivier
Deschênes, Sex Preferences, Marital Dissolution and the Economic Status of Women, 40 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 411, 413 (2005) (arguing that divorced women earn higher incomes than
never–divorced women).
156. CHILD SUPPORT: 2009, supra note 1, at 1, 4; see also Harris, supra note 2, at 160
(“Almost a quarter of custodial parents live below the level of poverty and that rate has been
virtually unchanged since 2001.”). Many children live below the poverty line; in 1975, 17% of
children under the age of eighteen lived below the poverty line. Id. at 158. That figure rose to
20% in the 1980s and did not begin to decline until early in the twenty-first century, when 16% of
children under eighteen lived in poverty. Id. However, the statistic rose to 20% again in 2009.
Id. at 158–59.
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of parents who subsequently divorce. 157
Furthermore, economic
disadvantages can potentially extend into a child’s adult life, causing some
American courts to order noncustodial parents to pay for their children’s
college educations.158
In sum, well over half of the children born in the next generation will be
born to unmarried or eventually-divorced couples. Because this class of
children traditionally has not received the same financial support as marital
children, it is important to maximize noncustodial parents’ payment of
child support. Direct rights of action against the noncustodial parent and
the government are powerful tools for custodial parents to recover child
support.
B. The Importance of a Direct Right of Action
There are two separate and distinct direct rights of action in child support
cases. First, one parent may directly sue the other parent; this option is
only available in the United States.159 Second, a parent relying on the
enforcement of child support by a government agency may sue the
government agency if he or she is dissatisfied with the agency’s collection
efforts; this method is only permitted in the United Kingdom.160 Indeed,
the role played by the courts may have an important impact on the
effectiveness of child support collection for innumerable children.
1. Suits Against the Government Agency
In the United States, a direct right of action against a government official
—in this context called a “private right of action”—is permitted in some
cases by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability on anyone who, under
color of state law, deprives another “of any rights, privileges, or immunities

157. See Harris, supra note 2, at 160–61 (noting that unmarried parents are much more likely
to live in poverty than parents who marry and subsequently divorce because of their youth and
lack of education).
158. See, e.g., Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 207 (Wash. 1978) (“[I]t has long been the
law in Washington that a divorced parent may have a duty of support for college education if it
works the parent no significant hardship and if the child shows aptitude.”); see also MO. ANN.
STAT. § 452.340.5 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013) (extending a parent’s duty to support if the child
enrolls in college no later than October after graduating from high school); Anna Stępień-Sporek
& Margaret Ryznar, Child Support for Adult Children, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 359, 360 (2012)
(explaining that post-majority child support is “neither uniform nor universal”).
159. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 112–114, 120–126, and accompanying text.
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secured by the Constitution and laws.”161 The U.S. Supreme Court held
that this provision safeguards certain rights conferred by federal statutes.162
The Court considered the applicability § 1983 to child support disputes
in Blessing v. Freestone.163 Five Arizona mothers whose children were
eligible for state child support services under Title IV–D of the Social
Security Act brought suit against the director of Arizona’s child support
enforcement agency, alleging that the agency did not adequately attempt to
obtain child support payments from their children’s fathers.164
The mothers blamed structural defects in Arizona’s child support system,
including “staff shortages, high caseloads, unmanageable backlogs, and
deficiencies in the State’s accounting methods and recordkeeping.”165 The
mothers requested broad relief, including a declaratory judgment that the
Arizona program violated the Title IV–D provisions that created rights
enforceable under § 1983, as well as an injunction requiring the agency to
comply substantially with Title IV–D in all operations.166
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted
summary judgment in favor of the state, and the mothers appealed.167 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, applying the
three main factors used to determine whether a statute creates a privately
enforceable right: (1) whether the plaintiffs were “the ‘intended
beneficiaries of the statute,’ [2] whether the plaintiffs’ asserted interests are
not so ‘vague and amorphous’ as to be ‘beyond the competence of the
judiciary to enforce,’ and [3] whether the statute imposes a binding

161. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
162. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1980) (“[T]he § 1983 remedy broadly
encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law.”); see also Candace
Chun, Comment, The Use of § 1983 as a Remedy for Violations of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: Why it is Necessary and What it Really Means, 72 ALB. L. REV. 461,
465 (2009) (arguing that a private right of action should be permitted as a method of enforcing
certain violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Daniel Pines, Comment,
Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of Action, 82 CALIF. L.
REV. 185, 186 (1994) (explaining that permitting a private right of action as a means of enforcing
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act would solve many of the Act’s problems).
163. 520 U.S. 329, 332–33 (1997).
164. Id. at 332–33, 337 (“In a lengthy complaint, respondents claimed that they had properly
applied for child support services but that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency
never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments from the fathers of their children.”).
165. Id. at 337.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 337–38 (noting that the district court “held that Congress had foreclosed private
actions to enforce Title IV–D by authorizing the Secretary to audit and cut off funds to States
with programs that do not substantially comply with Title IV–D’s requirements”).
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obligation on the State.”168 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Title IV-D
satisfied each factor and this did create a private right of action.169
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that Title IV-D did not
provide the mothers with an individually enforceable right to compel
Arizona’s child support agency to comply with its provisions.170 The Court
found it “readily apparent” that several of Title IV–D’s other provisions did
not satisfy the three factors used to identify statutory rights.171
Furthermore, the Court noted that “[e]ven if a plaintiff demonstrates that a
federal statute creates an individual right, there is only a rebuttable
presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983.”172
The United Kingdom takes the opposite approach to direct rights of
action against government agencies, permitting some judicial review of the
agency that enforces child support. Specifically, the court in Kehoe
explained that, “[i]f the Child Support Agency were to refuse to enforce a
claim because it made some error of law (such as misunderstanding the
extent of its statutory powers) [the custodial parent] could take proceedings
by way of judicial review.”173 Importantly, allowing for judicial review
permits custodial parents “to influence the enforcement process.”174
On appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, the parties
questioned the effectiveness of this remedy:
While the applicant doubted that a domestic court would do more
than issue a general order of mandamus for the CSA/Secretary of
State to comply with their duty, she did not rule out the possibility
of applying for specific measures to be included, whether by way
of an order for attachment of earnings or for committal, in which
context it would have been open to the courts, if they considered
it appropriate, to add specific directions. It is true that the courts
would not have awarded damages for any alleged periods in the
past during which the applicant might have considered the CSA to
have been culpably inactive. However, the Court considers that
the opportunity to obtain court orders which direct the relevant
authority to take appropriate and expeditious action must be
regarded as effectively addressing the applicant’s principal
168. Id. at 338 (quoting Freestone v. Cowan, 68 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d sub
nom. Blessing, 520 U.S. 329).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 333.
171. Id. at 344.
172. Id. at 341.
173. R (Kehoe) v. Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, [2005] UKHL 48 [2006] 1 A.C.
(H.L.) 68, [45] (appeal taken from Eng.).
174. Id.
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concern, namely, the ongoing failure of Mr K to pay child
support.175
Nonetheless, several custodial parents utilized the threat of judicial
review in attempting to force the child support agency to better enforce
support obligations.176 These efforts were not overly successful, and the
failures of the CSA led to its abolishment.177 It remains to be seen what
direct rights of action are preserved or created for custodial parents under
the United Kingdom’s new child support scheme.178
2. Suits Against the Noncustodial Parent
The law in the United States permits direct suits by the custodial parent
against the noncustodial parent, unless the custodial parent is on welfare.179
Inthose cases, the state generally supports the child through welfare
benefits and the custodial parent must assign the right to the child support
payment to the state.180 This allows the state to provide for vulnerable
children while also retaining the right to recover from the absent parent.181
Conversely, the United Kingdom intentionally omitted such a direct
action from the Child Support Act 1991.182 The British judiciary explained
that, although the system was intended to be a blend of public and private
rights, “fundamentally it [was] a nationalised system for assessing and
175. Case of Kehoe v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 2010/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 9, [47] (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22kehoe%22],%22doc
umentcollectionid%22:[%22COMMITTEE%22,%22DECISIONS%22,%22COMMUNICATED
CASES%22,%22CLIN%22,%22ADVISORYOPINIONS%22,%22REPORTS%22,%22RESOLU
TIONS%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-86980%22]}.
176. See, e.g., Robins, supra note 131; Jon Robins, Father’s Bid to Force CSA into Action,
THE OBSERVER (Feb. 18, 2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/feb/19/childrens
services.money.
177. See supra notes 131–135 and accompanying text.
178. See Neasa Macerlean, Child Support Chaos Is Finally Set to Be Sorted, INDEPENDENT
(July 21, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/money/spend-save/child-support-chaos-is-finally
-set-to-be-sorted-7962504.html (discussing the transition from the CSA to the Child Management
Service).
179. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining that families assign their support
enforcement rights to the state in exchange for welfare benefits).
181. It is possible that allowing for a direct action reflects society’s view of child support as a
private matter. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a “Culturally Cliterate” Family Law?, 23
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 267, 274 (2008) (“[T]he insistence on maintaining child support
as a private, rather than a state, obligation has given rise to a legal emphasis on ‘personal
responsibility,’ notably in welfare reform and paternity law.”).
182. JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, THE POLITICS OF CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 54 (2003)
(“English law [only] provided . . . that all parents should support their children [and that] no third
party—including a mother—could attempt to collect money from her former spouse to help her
raise her children.”).
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enforcing an obligation which each parent owes primarily to the child.”183
Specifically, the 1991 Act “replace[d] the powers of the courts, which
[could] no longer make orders for periodical payments for children save in
very limited circumstances.”184 However, denying judicial involvement in
this manner has certain costs.
C. The Costs of Child Support Enforcement by the Judiciary
There are significant costs and judicial expenditure of resources each
time a child support issue is brought before a court.185 There may be a
further waste of resources when a suit is brought against a parent who does
not have the financial resources to pay support, even if there is a judgment
against him or her.186 As one commentator noted,
[i]n the modern world of child support collection, in which most
debtors are plagued with negative credit reports, wage
assignments, driver’s license suspensions, tax refund intercepts,
and potential jail time, a parent who still fails to pay child support
likely has no significant monetary value from which the child
could benefit.187
Furthermore, limiting enforcement rights to government agencies may
prevent meritless suits against insolvent parents and consequently preserve
valuable resources. Indeed, “[m]any laws may only be enforced by
governmental agencies, precisely because of the concern that unwarranted
or harassing suits—or perhaps only an unduly burdensome multiplicity of
suits—may be filed if private citizens are also given enforcement rights.”188
However, blocking access to the court system is costly in itself if the
result is a reduction in child support collection. Most apparently, the state
is required to step into the shoes of the debtor parent to provide financially
for the child, unless the government agency is successful in recovering
183. Huxley v Child Support Officer (2000) 1 Fam LR 898, 908 (Austl.).
184. Id.
185. See J. Thomas Oldham, Abating the Feminization of Poverty: Changing the Rules
Governing Post-Decree Modification of Child Support Obligations, 1994 BYU L. REV. 841,
890–91 (1994).
186. See Maldonado, supra note 42, at 1002 (“Seventy percent of the $96 million owed in
back child support in 2003 was owed by men earning $10,000 per year or less, many of whom
were unemployed or employed part-time.”).
187. Wendee M. Hilderbrand, Note, When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The
Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights, 56
VAND. L. REV. 1907, 1936 (2003). Furthermore, “if the custodial parent is poor, the custodial
household remains poor after receiving the child support payment, even when the support
obligor’s income is high.” Ellman, supra note 100, at 151.
188. Karen Cordry, Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Everything Old Is New Again, in
WILLIAM NORTON, JR., ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 143, 165 n.23 (1999-2000 ed. 1999).
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support. In addition, without support from the custodial parent, the child
may not grow up with sufficient resources to enable him or her to
contribute to society to the same extent as other children.189
Although blocking access to the court system for custodial parents
seeking child support is not a costless option, there are two barriers to the
judicial system that could be erected: (1) prohibition of lawsuits against
government child support collection agencies by custodial parents,190 and
(2) prohibition of lawsuits between parents to accommodate the
government’s exclusive role in child support collection.191
The latter barrier—preventing parents from suing each other—may have
an impact on the maximization of child support enforcement. First and
foremost, this approach bars those with the greatest interest in enforcement
proceedings from those proceedings. This may be a major mistake because
the best enforcers are those with the greatest need for the enforcement of
the support obligation: those who need the money and who have an interest
in seeing results. While the state agency’s stake in child support collection
results from budgetary pressure to decrease the toll of unpaid child support
on the state’s public coffers, it is ultimately the custodial parent who
struggles to run a household without child support.
On the other hand, harnessing parents’ personal stake in child support
enforcement may be unsuccessful in certain cases because of the number of
people without financial means who start families.192 Often these parents
establish informal support arrangements between themselves and
accordingly do not take legal action, even if one parent technically owes
support to the other parent.193

189. See Maldonado, supra note 42, at 996–97 (discussing the problems caused by a child’s
inability to have a relationship with his or her father).
190. However, in some instances, the custodial parent may have to pay child support to the
noncustodial parent. See, e.g., Colonna v. Colonna, 855 A.2d 648, 651–52 (Pa. 2004) (requiring
the custodial mother to pay support to the non-custodial father in order to maintain a certain
standard of living for the children).
191. See supra notes 112–114, 120–126 (explaining that the United Kingdom intentionally
omitted parents’ right to sue each other from the U.K. enforcement system).
192. See Harris, supra note 2, at 159 (“[C]hild support enforcement practices are actually
harmful to many poor, non-marital children and their custodial mothers, in some cases reducing
economic support from the fathers and disrupting the fathers’ relationships with the children.”).
193. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 42, at 1010 (explaining that, because African
American fathers generally do not make enough to support their children, mothers work to build
relationships between the father and the child). Maldonado makes the excellent point that “[t]he
law has failed to distinguish between fathers who can pay child support but refuse (the true
deadbeats), and those who are unemployed or severely underemployed (those who are
deadbroke).” Id. at 1003.
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Prohibiting a direct action against the relevant child support agency
poses different issues. Specifically, allowing custodial parents to recover
for their dissatisfaction with the agency’s efforts may cause the litigation
floodgates to open.
Although increased litigation could result in
improvements in the agency’s performance, taxpayers will then be
responsible for both the agency’s mistakes and the support awards
themselves. Furthermore, meritless or harassing suits could exacerbate the
problem.194
However, the lack of both a direct right of action between parents and
meaningful judicial review of the relevant state agency results in a child
support enforcement system with no teeth. Therefore, given that parental
enforcement against the state agency may be costly, permitting a direct
action between parents as a cornerstone of the child support system may be
worth considering.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the enforcement of any law, the judiciary has a role to play.
Enforcement of child support obligations is no exception. Inevitably, some
noncustodial parents will fail to provide support for their children, and the
resulting costs to both the children and to society requires enforcement of
child support laws.
A comparison of the approaches of the United States and the United
Kingdom to the role of the judiciary in child support cases reveals distinct
differences. Although custodial parents in the United States are permitted
to sue noncustodial parents directly for support (unless the custodial parent
is on welfare), no such right of action exists in the United Kingdom.
However, there may be the possibility of judicial review of the relevant
government agencies in the United Kingdom, which does not exist in the
United States.
The advantages and disadvantages of each of these approaches must be
weighed carefully because of the number of children enforcement laws
affect. As more children than ever are born to unmarried or eventually
divorced parents, it is important to ensure that the children receive full
support from both parents.

194. See Cordry, supra note 188 (explaining that awarding enforcement rights to private
citizens may result in a burdensome number of suits or suits without merit).

